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Abstract What is to be done when οrst- and higher-order evidence point in op-
posite directions concerning the truth about p? The traditional response goes that
ideally rational agents ought to privilege one evidential order over the other, such
that an agent’s belief that p co-varies with her total evidence. But the level-splitter
zigs where others zag. Since each evidential order appears perfectly good in isol-
ation, she supposes her credences should be partitioned accordingly. On penalty
of believing against her total evidence, she responds to the pull of both evidential
orders. In other words, she is epistemically akratic. Sophie Horowitz has recently
argued that level-splitting views are almost universally irrational. To show as much,
she points to some cases of peer disagreement where a pro-akrasia verdict requires
(irrationally) concluding that S’s evidence is misleading. The purpose of this paper
is to deny that an on-off conception of agent-speciοc defeaters is called for: that is,
I argue that peer disagreement need not necessarily banish οrst-order evidence to
the realm of the misleading, and that a different approach is available to the pro-
akrasia crowd.
1 Introduction
In ‘Epistemic Akrasia,’ Sophie Horowiĵ argues that while rational epistemic akrasia
can be warranted in special cases, a pro-akrasia solution in standard cases is too intu-
itively costly to be right (Horowiĵ 2014). The problem of akratic belief states has in-
spired a triad of potential solutions in the literature of epistemology of disagreement:
two traditional, one contemporary. Traditional responses reject the notion of rational
epistemic akrasia. That is, they reject the view that one ought to believe p while sim-
ultaneously believing that p is unsupported by evidence. A contemporary response
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is that such belief states are only prima facie problematic and may even be rationally
required.
The paper is structured as follows. In §1, I introduce Horowiĵ’s Sleepy Detective
Problem and three responses to it: the traditional (anti-akrasia) conciliatory and steadfast
verdicts and the newer (pro-akrasia) level-spliĴing verdict. In §2, I motivate rational
epistemic akrasia. I foreshadow Horowiĵ’s reasons for thinking that level-spliĴing is
irrational in most cases, yet rationally required in others. In §3, I discuss two further
cases and give an overview of Horowiĵ’s account of evidential uncertainty and how
evidence can be considered either truth- or falsity-guiding. In §4, I give her argument
in support of level-spliĴing’s nearly universal irrationality, which features cases of peer
disagreement where pro-akrasia requires (irrationally) concluding that one’s evidence
is misleading. In §5, I argue that these cases hinge on an assumption that a certain
species of defeater commits level-spliĴers to forming the belief that their evidence is
misleading, and that since this assumption is false, it doesn’t follow that level-spliĴers
must conclude that their evidence is falsity-guiding. In doing this, I indirectly oěer an
alternative explanation for why akratic belief states may sometimes be rational despite
the worry posed by Horowiĵ.
2 What is epistemic akrasia?
‘Akrasia’ has classically meantweakness of will, such as in cases where S acts against her
beĴer judgment.1 Correspondingly, ‘epistemic akrasia’ refers to cases wherein S argu-
ably believes p against her beĴer judgment. (For example, when her belief that p ap-
pears inadequately supported by her available evidence.) While not all-encompassing
(and purposely somewhat imprecise, given current debates as to just what epistemic
akrasia is), this deęnition shall serve as a reasonable point of departure in understand-
ing what it is to be epistemically akratic.
The paper will proceed, as Horowiĵ does, with the evidentialist approach to un-
derstanding epistemic akrasia. Provisionally, I will consider the puzzle of whether
epistemically akratic belief states are to be thought rational as one which can be solved
or dissolved by seĴling on how an agent should apportion her belief that pwith respect
to her total evidence concerning p. If we suppose that two or more crucial parts of an
agent’s available evidence is both in favor of and against believing that p (and that she
is unable to suspend judgment), and the agent is ultimately uncertain as to whether p,
it otherwise remains unclear how and in which circumstances her belief that p could
1. An aĴempt to account for the ‘paradoxical irrationality’ of akratic agents is of course discussed
in the Protagoras, and also in Davidson (1982). Another account, that of Levy (2018), argues that what
we take to be (epistemically) akratic states are an agent’s mistaken belief that they believe that p. Levy
diěerentiates between belief that p and a(n) agent’s indistinct ęrst-order ‘beliefy’ representation(s) that
p.
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be rationally required.
Part of this puzzle’s traction is owed to emerging controversies about evidence.
The controversy currently at hand turns on a tension between two sorts of evidence:
ęrst- and higher-order evidence. The ęrst term is maybe the most familiar: ‘ęrst-order
evidence’ is that which bears directly on p’s truth value. Standard sources of ęrst-order
evidence include (non-exhaustively) perception and memory. Contrastingly, ‘higher-
order evidence’ is typically thought to be evidence about one’s evidence, or evidence
‘bearing on the functioning of one’s rational faculties, or on the signięcance of other
evidence that one has’ (see Horowiĵ, forthcoming). Higher-order evidence, then, can
speak to how S ought to interpret her ęrst-order evidence, and often crops up in the
form of testimony (as in cases of peer disagreement) or even reĚection upon one’s own
epistemic state (such the recognition of impairment or lack of expertise). For instance,
higher-order evidence’s impact on total evidence (especially concerning defeat, i.e.,
whether higher-order evidence can undercut or rebut ęrst-order evidence) remains at
large in recent literature (Christensen 2010; Feldman 2009; Lasonen-Aarnio 2014), and
what diěerentiates higher-order evidence from ęrst-order evidence is also an open
question.
There are many cases that serve as excellent candidates for framing the kind of
evidential tension which might rationalize epistemic akrasia.2 For simplicity, I’ll use
Horowiĵ’s: its key details bear centrally and specięcally on her criticisms of level-
spliĴing and the subject of this paper. The case:
Horowitz’s Sleepy Detective Sam is a police detective, working to
identify a jewel thief. He knows he has good evidence—out of the many sus-
pects, it will strongly support one of them. Late one night, after hours of
cracking codes and scrutinizing photographs and leĴers, he ęnally comes to
the conclusion that the thief was Lucy. Sam is quite conędent that his evid-
ence points to Lucy’s guilt, and he is quite conędent that Lucy commiĴed the
crime. In fact, he has accommodated his evidence correctly, and his beliefs
are justięed. He calls his partner, Alex. ‘I’ve gone through all the evidence,’
Sam says, ‘and it all points to one person! I’ve found the thief!’ But Alex is
unimpressed. She replies: ‘I can tell you’ve been up all night working on this.
Nine times out of the last ten, your late-night reasoning has been quite sloppy.
You’re always very conędent that you’ve found the culprit, but you’re almost
always wrong about what the evidence supports. So your evidence probably
doesn’t support Lucy in this case.’ Though Sam hadn’t aĴended to his track
2. Consider, for example, Alvin Plantinga’s ‘leĴer ęlching case’ (1986), where a man accused of steal-
ing a leĴer has (arguably excellent) ęrst-order evidence that he didn’t take it—in this case, his memory
of walking in the woods. He is in fact correct about his woods memory. As with the Sleepy Detective
case, there’s nevertheless a large body of higher-order evidence against him: he’s done similar things
before, and an extremely reliable person testięes that she witnessed the theft.
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record before, he rationally trusts Alex and believes that she is right—that he
is usually wrong about what the evidence supports on occasions similar to
this one (Horowiĵ 2014, 2).
To specify: Sam’s ęrst-order evidence (hereafter ‘FOE’) is the aforementioned
codes, leĴers, and photographs. Sam’s higher-order evidence (hereafter ‘HOE’) con-
sists in Alex’s testimony that Sam is probably unable to properly interpret FOE. Taking
together Sam’s ęrst- and higher-order evidence provides a (rough) picture of his ‘total
evidence.’3 Next I will spell out what each possible verdict has to say about how these
evidential orders should interact with one another, if at all.
Onemight think that the two evidential orders don’t (or shouldn’t) interact, and fur-
thermore that Sammight be rational in believing both that Lucy is the culprit while also
accepting Alex’s testimony that he is often wrong in situations such as these. This op-
tion permits rational epistemic akrasia.4 The view that akratic aĴitudes can be ration-
ally required in cases like Sleepy Detective is what Horowiĵ dubs the ‘level-spliĴing’
position. For our purposes, the shortened ‘pro-akrasia’ will often be used. If the de-
tective is epistemically akratic, then he’ll continue to believe that Lucy is the jewel thief
while believing that his total evidence doesn’t support this. On pro-akrasia, then, he
should split his levels of conędence and hold onto the ęrst-order belief that p given
FOE and the higher-order belief about his unreliability given HOE.
The traditional ‘anti-akrasia’ response is to deny that epistemically akratic states
are rational. On this view, it is often thought that epistemic levels should never operate
separately. An anti-akrasia proponent would apply this notion in the Sleepy Detective
case by requiring that Sam must base his belief in Lucy’s guilt on his total evidence.
For Sam, this would mean that he must either steadfastly remain conędent that Lucy
is guilty on the basis of FOE, or else be persuaded to reduce his conędence in her guilt
given Alex’s testimony that he ought to doubt his initial conclusion to the contrary.
3 Level-splitting
Horowiĵ calls the pro-akrasia view that epistemic levels should operate separately
‘level-spliĴing’ (Horowiĵ 2014), which is to be properly diěerentiated from epistemic
akrasia. Rather than merely labelling cases of ‘divergence between ęrst- and higher-
3. It’s not uncontroversial that Sam’s total evidence might contain more or less than what is said
here; this can vary depending on one’s views concerning which evidence an agent ought to consider.
4. I’m grateful to the aforementioned anonymous referee for pointing out that although level-spliĴers
hold the view that evidential orders should operate separately and that this goes some way in rational-
izing epistemic akrasia, one’s commitment to the interaction of evidential orders isn’t simultaneously a
commitment to level-spliĴing in epistemic akrasia cases. One might think, for example, that epistemic
akrasia is irrational without this entailing that evidential orders shouldn’t inĚuence one another, and
vice-versa.
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order aĴitudes’ (Horowiĵ 2014), level-spliĴing views rationally require such diver-
gences.5
In other words: level-spliĴing is a normative position, whereas epistemic akrasia is
used descriptively. I’d also like to note that Horowiĵ perceives that ęrst- and higher-
order belief mismatches as coming in degrees:
• Mќёђџюѡђ љђѣђљ-Ѡѝљіѡѡіћє prescribes being highly conędent that p despite hav-
ing high conędence that your evidence that doesn’t support your degree of cre-
dence in p.
• Eѥѡџђњђ љђѣђљ-Ѡѝљіѡѡіћє recommends high conędence in p while also being ra-
tionally highly conędent that (a) your evidence doesn’t support p, (b) your evid-
ence supports low conędence in p, or (c) your evidence supports ¬p.
These distinctions are a sticking point in section 4, where I’ll zero in on the belief state
depicted in ‘C’. Unless otherwise specięed, it can be assumed for now that when I refer
to level-spliĴing, I have in mind the gamut of akratic states given above.
A defense of pro-akrasia is founded in the thought that if either evidential order
seems perfectly good to us in isolation, our belief state ought to reĚect this somehow.
On the basis of both FOE + HOE, the level-spliĴer believes that p and believes that
there’s something ęshy about her total evidence for p. Again, many grounds for ęsh-
iness exist: misleading evidence, poorly-interpreted evidence, insignięcant evidence,
etc.
Horowiĵ argues that, barring a complex and much-discussed case, epistemic
akrasia is universally irrational.6 This caveat leads her to distinguish between two
kinds of cases, Ѡѡюћёюџё and ћќћѠѡюћёюџё. We shall feature an example or two from
each in sections 2.3 and 2.4. The cases are classed according to a couple of contrasting
features: (1) diěerent types of uncertainty, and (2) opposite background expectations
about how our evidence should point to the truth about p.
Uncertainty In standard cases, a would-be akratic agent is uncertain about what her
total evidence supports. The diĜculty here lies in discerning which order of evidence
is really geĴing it right about p. In nonstandard cases, even if she can be sure of what
her evidence should support, the problem is that she can’t be sure of what her evidence
is.
Truth- and falsity-guiding evidence Standardly, and nearly unanimously, we ex-
pect our evidence to be ѡџѢѡѕ-єѢіёіћє, so that ‘when it justięes high conędence in a
5. The two might easily be seen as interchangeable. I wish to avoid this confusion.
6. The exceptional case is that ofWilliamson’s ‘irritatingly austere’ clock (fromWilliamson 2011, 2014
discussed at length in Elga 2013); see p. 6 for Horowiĵ’s adaptation.
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proposition, that proposition is usually true, and when it justięes low conędence in a
proposition, that proposition is usually false’ (Horowiĵ 2014). But in unusual cases,
we can have the background expectation that our evidence—whatever it is—will vary
falsely with the proposition it is meant to support. That is, we expect that it will be
ѓюљѠіѡѦ-єѢіёіћє: it’ll support high conędence in a false proposition, and low conęd-
ence in a proposition we think is probably true. Horowiĵ concludes that special cases
like these are rare, but plausibly justify pro-akrasia.
Horowiĵ considers a number of epistemologists who argue that epistemic akrasia
is rationally required.7 We shall consider a pair of cases from two authors in particular:
Weatherson (n.d.), who uses a familiar case of justięed moral akrasia, and Williamson
(2011, 2014), whose case is purely epistemic. The abridged version of each:
Weatherson’s Kantian Professor By way of sophisticated and persuasive
argumentation, suppose yourKantian professor has given you good evidence
to believe that lying is categorically wrong. Nevertheless, when a murderer
inquires as to your roommate’s whereabouts, you lie, since lying is what you
ought to do. (Horowiĵ 2014)
Williamson’s Long Deduction Suppose a rational agent comes to know a
long series of claims and deduces their conjunction, C. She’s done so compet-
ently, but she realizes that since oftentimes memory and logical ability are
limited, people in her situation often make inferential errors while complet-
ing long deductions. It’s then highly probable on her evidence that she herself
has made such an error, and thus that she doesn’t know the conjunction. Still,
given that she’s competently deduced C, she knows C: its evidential probab-
ility is 1. It’s nevertheless highly probable on her evidence about fallibility
during long deductions that she doesn’t know C. So, she should be highly
conędent in C despite her high conędence that she doesn’t know C. (Horow-
iĵ 2014)
Borrowing a line from Lewis (1996), it seems a level-spliĴing agent can rationally
‘properly ignore’ evidence across epistemic levels: that is, form a kind of provisional
belief that p. Acknowledging the evidential force of FOE +HOE rids us of the drawback
of ignoring good evidence—in these cases, a properly performed proof and a well-
formulated normative claim.
7. Whatever the authors themselves may make of level-spliĴing, I’ll follow Horowiĵ in proceeding
as though the views presented here commit them to it.
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4 Problems for level-splitting
Horowiĵ gives more than a few examples where making the choice to split epistemic
levels goes terribly wrong. Central to this paper, however, is one case which is sup-
posed to demonstrate that Sam—were he epistemically akratic—would have strange
beliefs indeed about where his evidence points. In particular, Horowiĵ says: ‘If [the
detective] takes both “Lucy is the jewel thief” and “my evidence doesn’t support Lucy”
as premises, it seems he can engage in some patently bad reasoning’ (Horowiĵ 2014).
Horowiĵ’s argument is as follows. Suppose that Sam trusts Alex’s testimony and
forms the belief that the odds are 1:9 that Lucy is guilty. Suppose further that despite
this, he remains conędent that she is the culprit. Horowiĵ reasons that the detect-
ive must then think that, given such low odds, he ‘just got lucky’ about his true be-
lief. Given that he rationally trusts Alex, Sam should be conędent FOE doesn’t support
Lucy’s guilt. (That is, he should have low conędence that p.) HisHOE therefore pushes
him towards high conędence that ¬p. A plausible (extreme) pro-akrasia reading of his
total evidence, then, is that it’s falsity-guiding: that is, it supports high conędence in a
false proposition, ¬p.
Horowiĵ gives an analogous case, Ѡѝіјђё ѐќѓѓђђ, where Sam has received HOE
(Alex’s testimony) that his coěee’s been spiked with a reason-distorting serum
(Horowiĵ 2014). His coěee has not in fact been spiked. Although he has the reas-
onable background expectation that his FOE would be truth-guiding under normal
conditions, his partner’s testimony causes him to form the belief that he can’t properly
evaluate his evidence. Nevertheless, he has properly evaluated his evidence, and p is
a true belief. As in the above example, however, he also believes that his evidence is
misleading on the basis of HOE. This, argues Horowiĵ, shouldn’t be enough to cause
Sam to form the belief that his FOE is misleading, so it’s irrational to believe as much
given HOE.
In what follows, I’ll examine the claim that extreme pro-akrasia verdicts of the form
‘my evidence doesn’t support p’, or ‘my evidence supports low conędence in p’ must
land level-spliĴers in the predicament given above. The Spiked Coěee case, when
paired with its ‘just got lucky’ predecessor, is supposed to point out the following
absurdity. It would be absurd for an agent to form the belief that her evidence supports
¬p—that is, that her evidence is misleading—merely on the basis of a defeater bearing
on her agent’s diminished capacities (a ‘self-doubting defeater’).
5 Spiked Coffee, revisited
Horowiĵ writes:
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If Level-SpliĴing is right, and extreme cases of epistemic akrasia can be ra-
tional in Sleepy Detective, there is nothing wrong with Sam’s concluding
that his evidence is misleading in this way. But there is something wrong
with Sam’s concluding that his evidence ismisleading in this case. This sug-
gests that there is something wrong with Level-SpliĴing. (Horowiĵ 2014).
For the record, I’m conędent Horowiĵ is right on the order of it being silly for the de-
tective, spiked coěee or no, to draw the conclusion that his evidence is falsity-guiding.
It doesn’t seem at all plausible that a claim bearing on an agent’s capacities should
tarnish ęrst-order evidence to the eěect that it supports ¬p.
I’ll argue against Horowiĵ that a level-spliĴer needn’t conclude from a self-
doubting defeater (‘your coěee’s been spiked, so you should doubt your ability to
interpret your evidence!’) that her ęrst-order evidence is misleading. This would, as
Horowiĵ has claimed, be irrational. I leave open the possibility that that some level-
spliĴer or other might draw such a conclusion, but by my lights, there is an available
alternative.
Might we say instead that the detective’s conędence that Lucy is guilty should be
reduced by his knowledge of his track record? Alternatively, we could just as well leave
open the possibility that the detective might refrain from believing anything about
whether his ęrst-order evidence points to falsehood or truth. It’s not clear why self-
doubting defeaters must have an on-oě eěect on belief in such a way as to pressure
extreme level-spliĴers to immediately interpret their evidence as only truth-guiding
or falsity-guiding, but not something in between. The defeater might be classięed as
undercuĴing, or alternatively as neither raising nor lowering the probability that p.
These interpretations sidestep the need for self-doubting defeaters to outright rebut
the proposition that one’s ęrst-order evidence supports p.
If, for example, I were to espouse an extreme level-spliĴing view and then interpret
my evidence under the inĚuence of Irish coěee, I wouldn’t form the belief that my FOE
is—or must be—falsity-guiding. Depending on the amount of Irish coěee involved, I
might reduce my conędence as to where my evidence points, or alternatively take the
‘wait-and-see’ approach until morning. Still, I needn’t believe that my spiked coěee
points away from the truth about p, and neither does the detective. He could refrain
from believing anything about whether his ęrst-order evidence points towards truth
or falsehood, ormerely reduce his conędence that Lucy is guilty upon becoming aware
of his track-record.
In short, level-spliĴers aren’t commiĴed to the view that self-doubting defeaters
are necessarily falsity-guiding, or that such defeaters should always have the eěect
of transforming one’s evidence that p into evidence that ¬p. When paired with other
compelling strands of evidence, a creeping suspicion of one’s own unreliability might
lead an agent to wonder about what her ęrst-order evidence really supports, but then
again it may not.
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The same point evinces, I think, in another stock example of epistemic akrasia. If
we considerWilliamson’s Long Deduction case, wemight also think that a tendency to
make inferential errors of this sort shouldn’t serve the same evidential role as an added
line in a proof that points away from your conclusion thatC. Still, the extremely akratic
logician doesn’t appear commiĴed to concluding that her evidence is misleading. This
is because she can just as easily maintain high conędence that C while believing that
her evidence could be something unnervingly short of truth-guiding.
If my analysis is correct, the detective needn’t worry about his partner’s testimony
showing his FOE to be falsity-guiding; i.e., that it perplexingly supports Lucy’s inno-
cence (¬p)8, or somehow shrouds the truth about p in a thinner sense than rebuĴing it.9
In much the same way, it would also helpfully tie up the loose end that the extreme
level-spliĴer’s answer in long deduction (as initially stated) isn’t doomed to the same
fate.
6 Conclusion
On Horowiĵ’s view, an immediate problem with level-spliĴing is that it permits ir-
rationally concluding that one’s evidence is misleading in cases like Sleepy Detect-
ive. This, she argues, is problematic: clearly the Sleepy Detective Problem’s would-be
akratic agent can avoid beingmisled and can even point to a belief of his that should be
revised given his total evidence. I’ve concluded that if level-spliĴing is correct, then it’s
not the case that this evidence must be permissibly interpreted as misleading. There
may be internecine disagreements among level-spliĴers as to why and whether this
kind of move can be rational. In this case, level-spliĴers need not all think it permiss-
ible to interpret evidence in this fashion, so Horowiĵ’s criticism doesn’t seem to count
against the entire position.
The Sleepy Detective Problem’s very setup permits believing (rationally) that one’s
ęrst-order evidence might not be misleading. Why? I suspect this is because the self-
doubting defeater contained in Alex’s testimony is a long way oě from serving as pos-
itive evidence for the devastating conclusion that Sam, were he to continue believing
p, has been knowingly misled and yet still believes p. By my lights, this also tells a
plausible story about why a level-spliĴer’s belief state can be stable in cases like Wil-
liamson’s Long Deduction. Indeed, it’s hard to see how just about any close reading
of the case would lead one to believe that the akratic logician’s higher-order evidence
supports ¬p. For again, if I competently completed a long proof, the likelihood of my
8. While I ęnd this perplexing given how I’ve read the evidential support relation as being ‘HOE
rationalizes low conędence in p’ (and so on, and so on), I realize that the detective could very well have
it that HOE makes Lucy’s guilt less likely than her innocence. Thanks to an anonymous commentator
at UCSD for pressing me on this.
9. Thanks to Jennifer Carr for a rich discussion of this point and for an elegant formulation of it.
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geĴing it wrong about the conclusion wouldn’t be enough to induce credence x that
something other than C holds: I’d just have good higher-order evidence to suspend be-
lief that C, or reduce my credence in the proposition ‘I know C.’ I’d hardly be forced to
revise my belief state such that I have low conędence in C being the answer.
Even if Horowiĵ has split level-spliĴing, I’ve disagreed with the portion of her
strategy wherein an on-oě conception of defeaters is called for: that is, if peer dis-
agreementmust banish ęrst-order evidence to the realm of the misleading. I’ve oěered
an alternative that can beĴer explain how akratic belief states might be rational. This
point has perhaps a small yield in terms of the broader debate about responding to
counterevidence, but if correct, it extricates split-friendly epistemologists from the
view that their ęrst-order evidence must be misleading due to higher-order evidence
to the contrary. It allows the level-spliĴer to retain conędence that her evidence is
truth-guiding and vindicates the evidence they’ve evaluated from being doomed to
falsity-guiding status in paradigm cases.10
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